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Why the Olympics have three prizes and not just one 
1. Introduction 
In imperfectly discriminating contests the contestants contribute effort to win prize(s) 
and the highest effort does not necessarily secure a win (e.g. Dixit, 1987). Such contests are 
typical inter alia in sport (e.g. Neale, 1964). The existing literature largely concentrates on the 
single prize contests (e.g. Nitzan, 1994, p.52) despite overwhelming evidence that multiple 
prizes are awarded in real-life contests (e.g. Moldovanu and Sela, 2002, Szymanski, 2003, 
p.1142). Clark and Riis (1998, pp. 616-617) and Szymanski (2003, pp. 1142-1143) concluded 
that a single prize is always optimal in symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests. 
However, this result is only derived from an analysis of the symmetric Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) demonstrated that multiple prizes can be optimal in 
perfectly discriminating contests if the cost of effort is sufficiently convex. Szymanski and 
Valletti (2002) demonstrated that multiple prizes can be optimal in asymmetric imperfectly 
discriminating contests when the contestants are sufficiently different in ability.  
In symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests there may exist either a symmetric 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium or asymmetric equilibria (e.g. Cornes and Hartley, 2003). Perez-
Castrillo and Verdier (1992) demonstrated that the classical Tullock (1980) contest has a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium, asymmetric Nash equilibria, or a Stackelberg equilibrium. In this 
paper, I introduce multiple prizes into the Tullock (1980) contest in the same way as Clark and 
Riis (1998, pp.608-609) and Szymanski (2003, p.1142). The complete structure of equilibria is 
analyzed, including the asymmetric equilibria ignored in Clark and Riis (1998) and Szymanski 
(2003, p.1142, footnote 16). When the asymmetric equilibria are taken into account, a single 
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prize is not necessarily the optimal prize structure for symmetric imperfectly discriminating 
contests. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The complete structure of 
equilibria in the Tullock (1980) contest with a single prize is presented in section 2. Section 2 
mainly restates the results from Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992). Additionally, I argue that 
the Stackelberg equilibrium arises endogenously for the parameterization incompatible with the 
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In Section 3, I analyze the Tullock (1980) 
contest with two prizes (e.g. Szymanski, 2003, p. 1142) and demonstrate that the second prize 
may be optimal. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Tullock (1980) contest with a single prize 
Consider 2!n  identical contestants for a single prize 0"V . Each contestant 
contributes an effort 0!ie , # $ni ,1% , and has a probability & ' (
)
)
n
j
r
j
r
ii eeep
1
 of winning the 
prize. Tullock (1980) introduced the logit form of the contest success function :p # $1,0*+  
and it has been subsequently adopted in almost all studies of imperfectly discriminating 
contests (e.g. Corcoran, 1984, Hillman and Samet, 1987, Cleeton, 1989, Perez-Castrillo and 
Verdier, 1992, Clark and Riis, 1998, Szymanski and Valletti, 2002, Szymanski, 2003). 
Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998a) offered intuitive axiomatizations of the logit 
contest success function. 0"r  is the discriminating power of the contest success function and 
when +,*r  the contest becomes perfectly discriminating like an all-pay auction (e.g. 
Krishna and Morgan, 1997, Clark and Riis, 1998b). Assuming an individual’s risk neutrality, 
each contestant maximizes the net expected value of his or her contributed effort (1). 
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Equation (1) coincides with equation (1) in Cleeton (1989), equation (2) in Perez-
Castrillo and Verdier (1992) and equations (2)-(3) in Szymanski (2003). The complete solution 
for the Cournot-Nash equilibria of problem (1) is presented in equation (2), which coincides 
with proposition 4 in Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992). The proof is presented in appendix 3 
of Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992). 
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It follows from equation (2) that the Tullock (1980) contest has the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium when & '145 nnr , and the asymmetric Nash equilibrium when 
& ' & '2  21 6554 nrnn . A natural question arises: what is an equilibrium in the Tullock 
(1980) contest when 2"r , i.e. when there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium? Hillman and 
Samet (1987) and Baye et al. (1994) derived the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution. 
However, Tullock (1987) questioned the relevance of mixed strategies as a solution concept for 
the imperfectly discriminating contests where the strategy space is continuous. Perez-Castrillo 
and Verdier (1992, pp. 344-345) derived the Stackelberg equilibrium (3) when one of the 
contestants has the superior advantage of a first move. 
& '
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,2,0
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%)
4) 4   (3) 
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It follows from equation (3) that the Stackelberg equilibrium exists when 1!r  (e.g. 
Perez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992, p. 345). Specifically, the Stackelberg equilibrium (3) exists 
even when the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (2) does not exist ( 2"r ). When 2)r , the 
effort level of the Stackelberg leader (3) attains its minimum 2V  and coincides with the effort 
level in the Nash equilibrium (2). When 2)r , at most two players can participate in the Nash 
equilibrium, each contributing effort 2V  that yields the expected value of zero. Thus, in the 
Tullock (1980) contest the definitions of the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium coincide when 
2)r . The result is remarkable because the Nash equilibrium continuously transforms into the 
Stackelberg equilibrium when the contest becomes sufficiently discriminating ( r  passes the 
benchmark value of 2). Additionally, it extends the tendency of the Nash equilibrium to 
transform from the symmetric to the asymmetric equilibrium by decreasing the number of 
active contestants when the contest becomes relatively discriminating ( r  passes the benchmark 
value of 1). Cleeton (1989, pp. 9-10) and Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992, pp. 343-344) 
discussed the endogenous entry-exit in the Tullock (1980) contest. 
Let us consider in detail the Tullock (1980) contest when 2"r . By observing his best 
response function (e.g. Perez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992, pp. 337-339) a contestant realizes 
that it is inevitable to have only one active contestant in equilibrium. In other words, at most 
one contestant may contribute positive effort otherwise there is no stable equilibrium. There is, 
of course, the natural indeterminacy of the identity of this active contestant since all contestants 
are ex ante identical. Although it is an important issue on its own, the economic models (and 
this paper is no exception) typically assume that the coordination problem is solved. 
Figure 1 plots the best response function of the active contestant ( 1e ) against all 
possible effort levels of another contestant ( 2e ) and vice versa. The two best response functions 
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do not intersect, i.e. the Cournot-Nash equilibrium does not exist. Consider the situation when 
02 )e , i.e. the second contestant has no incentive for active participation, which is the only 
possible scenario compatible with a stable equilibrium. The first contestant may then set an 
infinitely small effort +* 01e  that maximizes his instantaneous expected value (1). However, 
it leads to the unstable melioration equilibrium (e.g. Herrnstein, 1991, Herrnstein and Prelec, 
1991). The second contestant then obtains an incentive for active participation and the positive 
expected value for the first contestant gets eroded. Alternatively, the first contestant may set the 
effort (3), which is just sufficient to keep the second contestant away from participating.  
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Figure 1 Best response functions of two contestants in a Tullock (1980) contest when r=3 
The Stackelberg equilibrium (3) arises endogenously in the Tullock (1980) contest 
when 2"r , i.e. when there is no room for two active participants. The assumption that the 
contestants are asymmetric (e.g. one of them has the first move advantage) is not necessary. To 
avoid the unstable melioration equilibrium it is only necessary that each contestant has a 
(common) knowledge that others behave exactly as he does. Huck et al. (2002) recently 
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provided experimental evidence that the Stackelberg equilibrium arises endogenously in the 
symmetric set-up. Further discussion of the endogenous Stackelberg equilibrium can be found 
in van Damme and Hurkens (1999). 
Equation (2) and equation (3), when 2"r , completely characterize the structure of 
equilibria in the Tullock (1980) contest with the single prize. When two or more contestants 
actively participate in the Tullock (1980) contest, they contribute identical effort by best 
responding to each other. When only one contestant actively participates in the contest, he does 
not best respond to the other (passive) contestants but behaves strategically as the Stackelberg 
leader. 
Notice, that for a given r the aggregate effort (
)
n
i
ie
1
 and the average effort (
)
n
i
ien 1
1  reach 
their maximum in the symmetric Nash equilibrium and their minimum in the asymmetric 
equilibria. The maximum individual effort 
# $ ini
e
,1
max
%
 exhibits the opposite pattern. If the aggregate 
(average) effort is the objective of the contests’ organizers then the asymmetric equilibria are 
undesirable. The same holds true if the objective of the contests’ organizers is a better 
competitive balance (a closer contest e.g. Szymanski, 2003, p.1143). The standard deviation of 
the contestants’ effort is minimum (zero) only in the symmetric Nash equilibrium. The best 
policy to avoid the asymmetric equilibria in the single prize contest is to limit the number of 
contestants. However, when 2"r  the asymmetric equilibrium is unavoidable due to the 
exogenous nature of the discriminating power r. This problem can be cured with the 
introduction of multiple prizes as shown in section 3. 
Finally, it is interesting to notice that in the Stackelberg equilibrium VeST
r
)
+,* 1
lim . 
When the contest becomes increasingly discriminating (less noisy) one contestant contributes 
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an effort STe1  close to the prize value V and no other contestants participate. The equilibrium 
effort STe1  cannot fall too short of V. Otherwise a passive contestant has the incentive to 
contribute an effort slightly above STe1 . Such higher effort then wins the prize almost with 
certainty (the contest is almost perfectly discriminating) and it has the positive expected value. 
Since VeST
r
)
+,* 1
lim , the possibility of observing Ve
n
i
i "(
)1
 (“over dissipation of rents” 
conjectured by Tullock, 1980) does not occur in the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
3. Tullock (1980) contest with two prizes 
Consider the contest described in section 2 with two prizes VV 7)1  and 
& ' # '1,5.0,12 %4) 77 VV  instead of the single prize V. Each contestant contributes an effort 
0!ie , # $ni ,1% , and has the probability & ' (
)
)
n
j
r
j
r
ii eeep
1
1  of winning the first prize and the 
probability & ' & ' ( (
6
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1 1
12  of winning the second prize. Given the logit contest 
success function & '.1p , the probability of winning the second prize & '.2p  is “simply the 
probability of winning a contest with 14n  contestants conditional on not having won the first 
prize” (e.g. Szymanski and Valletti, 2002). The optimization problem of each contestant is 
given by equation (4). Equation (4) is equivalent to equations (5)-(6) in Szymanski (2003). 
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3.1 The structure of equilibria 
When three or more contestants actively participate in the Tullock (1980) contest with 
two prizes, they best respond to each other and contribute identical (positive) effort. The 
remaining (if any) contestants contribute zero effort. When only two contestants actively 
participate in the contest, they do not necessarily best respond to each other because they may 
need to behave strategically. This case is considered in detail later on. A straightforward 
maximization of equation (4) yields the equilibrium level of effort (5). 
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where # $nm ,3%  is the number of active contestants in equilibrium. When nm )  equation (5) 
coincides with formula (7) in Szymanski (2003, p. 1143). The number m of active participating 
contestants in equilibrium is determined from the following constraint. An active contestant 
cannot contribute the effort (5) that yields the negative expected value (the expected value of 
zero effort is always zero). This results in constraint (6). 
1
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The number of active contestants is the highest number # $nm ,3%  that satisfies constraint (6).  
It follows from (5)-(6) that the Tullock (1980) contest with two prizes has a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium when & '
& ' & '7444
4
5
11
1
2 nn
nnr . It is noteworthy that the upper bound on the 
discriminating power r of the contest success function compatible with the existence of the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium decreases in 7 . In other words, when more of a total prize fund V 
is shifted to the second prize, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is compatible with a wider range 
 10
of the contest success functions. Equations (5)-(6) also imply that when 
& '
& ' & ' 77 31
6
11
1
2 +
55
444
4 r
nn
nn  the Tullock (1980) contest with two prizes has an asymmetric 
Nash equilibrium with at least three active contestants. It follows from constraint (6) that the 
number m of active contestants in an asymmetric Nash equilibrium increases when more of a 
total prize fund is shifted to the second prize.  
It follows from (6) that when & '7316 +"r , at most two contestants may contribute 
positive effort in equilibrium. The minimum number of active contestants in the Tullock (1980) 
contest with two prizes is two. Whatever the effort of one active contestant is, at least one more 
contestant always has the incentive for active participation if the second prize exists. When 
only two contestants actively participate in the Tullock (1980) contest with two prizes, three 
different types of equilibria exist. First, two active contestants may contribute identical effort 
& '1225.02,1 4) 7rVe . This is the asymmetric Nash equilibrium (5) for the case 2)m .1 This 
equilibrium is sustainable when two active contestants have the incentive for active 
participation but there is no room for three active contestants in equilibrium. Formally, 
constraint (6) holds for 2)m  but does not hold for 3)m  i.e. & ' & '5.01316 455+ 77 r . 
Additionally, 24n  passive contestants have no incentive for active participation given the 
equilibrium effort of two active contestants. Formally, the equilibrium effort 
& '1225.02,1 4) 7rVe  must satisfy the constraint (7), which approximately can be written as the 
constraint & '364 4! 7r .2  
                                                          
1 This equilibrium also coincides with the asymmetric Nash equilibrium (2) for the case 2)m  when the single 
prize is equal to the difference between the first and the second prize in the two-prize contest: & 'V12 47 . 
2 The exact constraint is & '& '& ' & '& '1242112 11 4+!++4 4 ffffr r 77 , where f is a non-negative solution 
of the cubic equation & '& ' & ' & '& ' 021126141212 23 )44+4+4++4+ 777 rrfrrff . 
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Intuitively, the two-player asymmetric Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium when two 
active contestants know that they obtain at least the second prize & 'V741  with certainty. Such 
confidence arises because the contest is sufficiently discriminating. If three contestants attempt 
to participate they all expect the negative value in equilibrium. Each of two active contestants 
then chooses the effort that maximizes his chance of winning the difference between the first 
and the second prize: & 'V12 47 . 
The second type of equilibrium is a mixture of the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium. It 
occurs when & ' & '5.01316 455+ 77 r  but & '1225.02,1 4) 7rVe  does not satisfy constraint 
(7). For example, this case happens when a total prize fund is more or less equally divided 
between two prizes ( 5.0@7 ). Each of two active contestants then has an incentive to 
contribute a very low effort (two prizes are more or less the same and there is no sense in 
strong competition). However, constraint (7) warrants each of the two active participants from 
reducing his or her effort too much. Otherwise, a third contestant becomes motivated in 
participation and the two incumbents cannot remain assured that they receive at least the 
second prize with certainty. Thus, in equilibrium one active contestant chooses the minimum 
effort 1e  so that the constraint (7) holds at most as equality (given an effort 2e  of the second 
contestant). He behaves strategically as if the Stackelberg leader is keeping other contestants 
away from participation. The second active contestant chooses his effort 2e  that maximizes the 
expected value (4) given that the first active contestant contributes 1e  and the remaining 24n  
contestants contribute zero effort. He behaves as the classical Cournot-Nash best responder. 
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Formally, equation (8) describes the equilibrium behavior of two active contestants in this 
mixed Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium. 
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The third type of equilibrium is an analogue of the Stackelberg equilibrium in the 
contest with two prizes. It occurs when & '5.01 4" 7r . Such a contest is almost perfectly 
discriminating. Two active contestants cannot end up in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium (5) 
for the case 2)m . In the Nash equilibrium each active contestant has to contribute such a high 
effort that this effort has the negative expected value. Intuitively, if one contestant contributes 
low effort, the second contestant has the incentive to contribute a slightly higher effort. The 
second contestant then wins the first prize almost with certainty (the contest is almost perfectly 
discriminating) and his or her effort has the expected positive value. However, the first 
contestant then has the incentive to increase his or her effort and so forth. This situation is 
similar to the single prize contest when 2"r .  
 Two active contestants cannot end up in a stationary equilibrium by best responding to 
each other’s effort. Therefore, they contribute efforts 21   and ee  that are just sufficient to give 
the remaining 24n  passive contestants no incentive for active participation. The first active 
contestant submits the effort & ' rrVe r111 1 44)7 . It follows from formula (3) that such an 
effort is just sufficient to eliminate any incentive for active participation (for the remaining 
14n  contestants) arising from the prospect of winning the first prize V7 . However, there still 
exists a positive value second prize & 'V741 . It gives the incentive for active participation for at 
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least one more contestant. Thus, the second active contestant submits the effort 
& ' & ' rrVe r112 11 444) 7 . Formula (3) shows that such effort is just sufficient to give the 
remaining 24n  contestants no incentive for active participation stemming from the prospect of 
winning the second prize & 'V741 . When ,*r , i.e. when the contest becomes an all-pay 
auction with 2 prizes, the first contestant submits an effort Ve 7)1  and the second contestant 
submits an effort & 'Ve 74) 12 . Thus, in this Stackelberg equilibrium two active contestants 
bid the exact values of two prizes and the remaining contestants bid zero. The possibility of 
“over dissipation of rents” Ve
n
i
i "(
)1
 does not occur. 
Table 1 conveniently summarizes the structure of equilibria in the Tullock (1980) 
contest with two prizes and 2"n  contestants. In the special case 2)n , the equilibrium is 
& '1225.021 4)) 7rVee  when & '5.01 45 7r  and & ' & ' 0,112 2111 )44) 4 errVe r7  when 
& '5.01 4" 7r . When 1)7 , table 1 presents the structure of equilibria in the Tullock (1980) 
with the single prize (as presented in section 2). 
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Table 1 The structure of equilibria in the Tullock (1980) contest with two prizes ( 2"n ) 
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The intuitive explanation of the equilibrium structure from table 1 is as follows. When 
the contest is relatively undiscriminating, all contestants actively participate in the contest 
because there is a possibility to win a prize (almost by chance) while contributing low effort. 
When the contest becomes sufficiently discriminating, up to 24n  contestants may drop out 
from the competition. The remaining active contestants are expected to contribute such a high 
effort that it erases any expectations of winning a prize for the passive contestants. However, 
when a prize fund is more evenly divided, fewer contestants drop out than when a prize fund is 
largely allocated to the first prize. Even when the contest is sufficiently discriminating, there is 
a higher chance to win one of two prizes than the single prize. When the contest is almost 
perfectly discriminating, only two contestants actively participate in equilibrium, which may be 
the Nash, mixed Nash-Stackelberg or two-player Stackelberg equilibrium.  
3.2. Comparative statics 
The contests’ organizers may have three different objectives—to maximize an 
individual’s effort (
# $ ini
e
,1
max
%
), to minimize the standard deviation of the contestants’ effort or to 
maximize the aggregate (average) effort. In other words, the contests’ organizers may wish to 
observe the highest winning effort (the breaking of a world record), a close contest (a 
competitive balance resulting in an interesting competition) or to maintain the overall quality of 
the contest (e.g. Szymanski, 2003, p. 1143). Which prize structure suits each of these goals the 
best?  
Suppose that the contests’ organizers wish to maximize an individual’s effort (
# $ ini
e
,1
max
%
). 
Table 1 shows that the introduction of the second prize (decrease in 7 ) unambiguously reduces 
the highest submitted effort for all possible parameterizations. Thus, the single prize contest is 
the optimal contest architecture for maximizing an individual’s effort. Figure 2 demonstrates 
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this conclusion for a contest with 10 participants. Intuitively, when more of a total prize fund is 
shifted to the second prize, the expected value of winning either the first or the second prize 
increases. The chances of winning a prize become more favorable for each level of an 
individual’s effort. Thus, active contestants are motivated to decrease their effort in 
equilibrium.  
Additionally, there is an indirect effect. When more of a total prize fund is shifted to the 
second prize, the number of active contestants either increases or remains the same. This 
conclusion follows from the equilibrium conditions in table 1 — when 7  decreases, the 
number m of active contestants has to increase (to sustain the same discriminating power r). If 
more contestants actively participate in the contest, the active contestants are additionally 
motivated to reduce their effort (e.g. Cleeton, 1989, pp. 9-10; Szymanski, 2003, p.1142). 
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Figure 2 Maximum individual effort in a contest with 2 prizes and 10 contestants 
Suppose that the contests’ organizers wish to maintain a competitive balance (close 
contest). Their objective then is to minimize the standard deviation of the contestants’ effort. In 
the Cournot-Nash equilibria when m active contestants contribute identical effort me , the 
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standard deviation of the contestants’ effort is & 'nmmem 41 . When more of a total prize fund 
is shifted to the second prize, the effort me  of active contestants unambiguously decreases 
(table 1 and figure 2). Thus, the gap between the efforts of active ( me ) and passive (zero) 
contestants is narrowed and, ceteres paribus, the standard deviation of effort decreases.  
The introduction of the second prize may also increase the number m of active 
contestants. When active contestants are in relative majority ( 2nm ! ), the increase in their 
number unambiguously decreases the standard deviation of effort: & 'nmmem 41 . Otherwise, 
the increase in the number of active contestants can widen the dispersion of effort in the 
contest. Figure 3 demonstrates this conclusion for the contest with 10 participants. When five 
or more contestants actively participate in the single prize contest ( 25.15r ), the introduction 
of the second prize always reduces the standard deviation of the contestant’s effort. When less 
than five contestants actively participate in the contest ( 25.1"r ), the introduction of the 
second prize can increase the standard deviation of effort. Thus, when the objective of the 
contests’ organizers is a competitive balance, the introduction of the second prize is always 
desirable when the majority (but not all) contestants actively participate in the single prize 
contest.  
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Figure 3 Standard deviation of effort in the contest with 2 prizes and 10 contestants 
Finally, suppose that the contests’ organizers wish to maintain the overall quality of the 
contest. Their objective then is to maximize the aggregate (
)
n
i
ie
1
 or the average (
)
n
i
ien 1
1  effort in 
the contest. When more of a total prize fund is shifted to the second prize, it has a twofold 
effect on the aggregate (average) effort contributed in the contest. On the one hand, the effort of 
active contestants unambiguously decreases (table 1 and figure 2). On the other hand, the 
number of active contestants may increase. Thus, the introduction of the second prize has an 
ambiguous effect on the aggregate (average) effort in the asymmetric equilibria. Figure 4 
demonstrates this conclusion for the contest with 10 participants. When the symmetric 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is sustainable in the single prize contest ( 910Ar ), the introduction 
of the second prize always reduces the aggregate (average) effort. This result is well 
documented in the literature (e.g. Clark and Riis, 1998; Szymanski, 2003, p.1142). However, in 
the asymmetric equilibria the introduction of the second prize may increase the aggregate 
(average) effort when the number of active contestants increases (e.g. 6.1,10 )) rn ).  
Majority actively participates
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Figure 4 Aggregate effort in the contest with 2 prizes and 10 contestants 
The aggregate effort cannot exceed the total prize fund V (figure 4). It can fall short of V 
when the contestants end up either in the symmetric Nash equilibrium (the contest is poorly 
discriminating) or in the asymmetric equilibria with few active contestants (the contest is very 
discriminating). When the contests’ organizers observe low aggregate effort with 100% 
participation, the problem is the poor discriminating power of the contest. Shifting more of a 
total prize fund away from the first prize cannot cure such problem (on the contrary it only 
aggravates the problem). However, when the contests’ organizers observe low aggregate effort 
with many passive contestants, the problem is the extreme discriminating power of the contest. 
In this case, if the discriminating power of the contest success function is known, the contests’ 
organizers can calculate the optimal size of the second prize that maximizes the aggregate 
effort. When the discriminating power of the contest success function is unobservable, the 
contests’ organizers may increase the number of active contestants by shifting more of a total 
prize fund away from the first prize. When only a few contestants (ideally one contestant) are 
endogenously passive, the aggregate effort is maximized. Generally, it may not reach its 
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absolute maximum V but it cannot fall substantially short of V. When all but one contestant 
actively participate in the contest, even a small deviation of the aggregate effort from V is 
sufficient to trigger the endogenous entry and exit (e.g. figure 4 when 2.11.1 55 r ), which is 
observable for the contests’ organizers. Thus, in order to maximize the aggregate effort, the 
contests’ organizers should offer enough prizes to leave only a few (ideally one) passive 
contestants in the asymmetric equilibria.  
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4. Conclusion 
This paper explores the asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric imperfectly 
discriminating contest with the logit contest success function and linear cost of effort, known in 
the literature as the Tullock (1980) contest. Such contests are typical in high-level sport. The 
asymmetric equilibria arise in the symmetric setup when the contest is sufficiently 
discriminating and some contestants drop out from competition. This creates an interesting 
coordination problem (indeterminacy of the ex ante identical individuals who drop out) and a 
commitment problem in the endogenous Stackelberg equilibrium. These questions are left for 
further (perhaps experimental) research.  
The single prize is not necessarily the optimal prize structure when the contestants are 
identical in effort ability. Multiple prizes may be desirable when the contests’ organizers wish 
to maintain a competitive balance or the overall quality of the contest. The introduction of 
multiple prizes always reduces the standard deviation of the contestants’ effort when the 
majority (but not all) of the contestants actively participate in the contest. The introduction of 
multiple prizes may also increase the aggregate (average) effort contributed in the contest. On 
the one hand, multiple prizes always reduce the effort of active contestants. On the other hand, 
multiple prizes may increase the number of active contestants in the asymmetric equilibria. 
Thus, the aggregate (average) effort always decreases in the symmetric Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium but it may increase in the asymmetric equilibria with the introduction of multiple 
prizes. 
Interestingly, in Ancient Greece the Olympics had only one official prize (an olive 
branch), which is the optimal prize structure for maximizing an individual’s effort. In contrast, 
the modern day Olympics have three official prizes (gold, silver and bronze medals). 
 21
Apparently, during the last 2500 years the preferences of the general public have changed from 
an individual record-breaking performance in favor of interesting competition and/or a high 
overall quality of the contest. 
If the discriminating power of the logit contest success function is known, the contests’ 
organizers can design the optimal prize structure to meet their objectives. Further extension of 
this work could be to design the optimal prize structure when the discriminating power is 
unknown. This would be a quest for the probabilistically optimal prize structure that suits the 
objectives of the contests’ organizers within the widest range of the contest success functions. 
The single prize contest may be still probabilistically optimal though it is not necessarily 
optimal for a specific parameterization. It would be intriguing to explore under which 
conditions three prizes (commonly observed in the real-life contests) are desirable.  
Imperfectly discriminating contests can be viewed in their relation to the all-pay 
auctions. When the contest becomes progressively discriminating, first the symmetric and then 
the asymmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) become unsustainable. Two 
alternative equilibrium solution concepts exist for the highly discriminating contests and all-
pay auctions. The first is the solution in mixed strategies. The second (advocated in this paper) 
is the solution in pure strategies for the endogenous mixed Nash-Stackelberg or pure 
Stackelberg equilibrium. In the symmetric (common value) all-pay auction this solution 
concept yields the equilibrium where k participants bid exactly the value of one of k prizes and 
the remaining participants bid zero. This equilibrium contrasts with the solution in mixed 
strategies (e.g. Clark and Riis, 1998b, Moldovanu and Sela, 2001). The interpretation of such 
duality may be that the solution in mixed strategies is the mathematical method to model the 
natural indeterminacy of the asymmetric equilibrium when all participants are ex ante identical. 
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